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CAN CIVILIZATION BECOME CHRISTIAN

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The crusades marked the break-up of an institutionalized and provincial world, the limit of a culture characteristically Roman. In politics, the crusades, the resort of kings to further the monarchical system, were the beginnings of a movement that ended far off in a high tide of democracy. Intended to increase the power and authority of the church they introduced a liberalizing movement that resulted in the Reformation. Entered upon in a blind and dogmatic devotion they prepared the way for the revival of learning and gave to science its early impetus. In a day when philosophy was scholastic and pedantic were sown the seeds destined to revolutionize philosophical systems. Indeed the perspective of history will show that many of the movements of the latest century had their roots in the results that grew out of the greatest previous world upheaval, the crusades. As one can best compare mountain range with mountain range by ascending the highest peaks so it may be possible to get light on the present situation by considering the developments that came from that far-off time.

Of these various developments commonly known as the Renaissance the deeper movements came to the later flowering. The period of revolution in government and of the enlightenment in philosophy was really the after-flowering of the earlier efforts.

The whole movement from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries is the story of a developing individualism, which sprang from the revival of the Hellenistic spirit. It represents the breaking away from cramping institutionalized forms, the protest of the individual against tyrannical dominance and over-lordship of every kind. It nursed the dream that the largest good to the whole could come only out of the largest development of the individual. Hence it was a movement of vast significance in historical results. Upon its doctrine and achievements have been built some of the most precious accomplishments of society.

Rousseau may be named as the chief spokesman for individualism in its late political evolution. He represented that mighty political revulsion which resulted in the establishment of independence in America and culminated in a new democracy in Europe.

Nor was Rousseau's influence confined to the realm of politics. He gave a tremendous impetus to the romantic movement in literature. A prevailing passion of his age was the passion for self-expression. Stress was laid upon personal meditation, reflection, and experience altogether out of proportion to their real value. The writing of journals became a common literary occupation. Out of this grew an over-valuation of both the cultural and religious worth of these inner experiences. One most profoundly influenced was the poet Goethe. His life story became one of an effort for individual development at any moral cost. The end of emotional attainment was held to justify the means, with the result that morals, religion, and

the sense of honor were sacrificed to individual culture. We note in Goethe the beginning of that process which has so profoundly influenced the literature of the nineteenth century and which has given us Nietzsche and the contemporary doctrine of the Superman.

Rousseau's *Emile* became the basis of an individualistic theory of education which is a widely prevailing standard in the educational system of today. Its development has been attended by an ever increasing secularization of education. Worse than that, the place of morality and religion in cultural development has not only been ignored, in too many quarters it has become educational anathema. It has been dubbed unscientific and a prejudice has been created against it. Pure culture has been held as not only complete when separated from deep religious sentiment, but religious sentiment has been widely held as incompatible with deep culture or with scientific attainment. The influence of individualism in education has run the limit of its progress in the Prussian Kultur, and has exerted a marked influence in many institutions of learning.

On the ethical side the progress of individualism was strangely influenced from behind its own age. Spinoza was scarcely known for a hundred years after his work was done. That he then became a power was largely due to the resurrection of his system by Herder and its acceptance by Goethe. Spinoza's doctrine that we become one with God by an act of reason became the key-note of Goethe's *Faust*. Whatever increases the understanding or is useful to the individual cultural development is morally good. According to this ethic, pity, shame, remorse, repentance are but vices that repeat the offense. One who regrets an evil past is weak and conscious of his weakness. The will to knowledge and to power are the moving impulses of great characters. Thus was injected into the world of education, art and literature that subtle

poison which has embarrassed individualism with an intolerable burden.

This ethical development might have been far more wide-spread among the nations of democracy had there not been another movement contemporaneous with it and which prospered on the soil of individualism. This movement was religious, and though commonly identified with the name of Wesley, has permeated all surviving forms of Christianity. It turned the wine of the new enthusiasm for individualism into new religious wine-flasks. Great emphasis was placed upon individual internal experience and upon individual culture. While no doubt this led to many excesses and to some misunderstanding of religious reality, it had the balance wheel of moral and religious devotion which kept it from running into a pure selfishness like that of Super-manism. When eventual history comes to be written it will be discovered as an inestimable influence in individual restraint, and in the moralization and strengthening of free institutions. Had it not been for this deeper religious influence running parallel with the movement of individualism, individualism could have accomplished little for democracy but ruin. Democracy without moral and spiritual restraint is impossible, and has been so demonstrated from the time of the excesses of the Reign of Terror to the exaltation of Russian Bolshevism. True democracy means self-government and self-government is impossible without the presence in the individual of restraining moral and spiritual influences.

In science, individualism has manifested itself in the emphasis upon the empirical method. Each individual can conduct his own experiment, and his experience becomes the ultimate word for science. The tendency has been to protest against the restraining influence of any unity or system and to emphasize the pluralistic view of life. The extreme of this development is to be seen in men of the

type of Haeckel, and in many unjustified claims of modern materialistic science.

In philosophy, the movement has been along the lines of empiricism, realism, positivism, and intellectual skepticism. A persistent attempt has been made to clear the philosophical field of all religious and theistic implications in an effort to be more scientific. The result has been an inadequate and one-sided view of the human personality. Viewed as a mere receptacle for material and outward born impulses, or at best a conglomeration of reactions, the individual has become in philosophic thought little else than an automaton incapable of moral action and passing on the exact ratio of impressions received.

With such an interpretation of the person it is easy to arrive at a perverted view of individual culture, such as possessed the minds of many of the early and late romantics. The emphasis on the evolutionary theory seemed to put the weightier elements of development beyond the power of individual responsibility. It further laid great stress upon the development of the individual as the goal of all progress. While it exalted the development of individuals it likewise taught that less fortunate forms must perish to create the typical man. If one were, then, a "free-spirit," typical man, or "Super-man" there should be no distress at the suffering of the less perfect for one's own better advancement and deeper culture. One needed only a certain egotistic assurance that he was of the "Super-man" type, and all the world was to lie like an oyster at his feet, to be opened and swallowed at his pleasure.

It does not take such an individualism long even though it start from a socialistic standpoint, to become the narrowest and meanest kind of an autocracy. It may be the autocracy of class, of birth, of education, of religious beliefs, or even of the proletarian. Its significant mark is

that its hand is set against all other classes; its dream is of individual preferment and exaltation. Its hope is the renovation of the world by the subjection of all other wills to its own. Its weakness is in its selfishness. In the name of individualistic development the greatest crimes have been and are being committed. The only reason that such a theory can blind the hearts of men is because they fail to take into account the reality of moral and spiritual values. An æstheticism which leads the poet or artist to plunge into moral excesses for their cultural value overlooks the fact that any moral excess removes the fineness and delicacy which alone can make art or poetry great. A culture which is built up at the expense of toil and hardship on the part of forgotten multitudes is a false culture which carries with it its own curse and its own undoing.

It is not strange that the individualistic theory of culture should eventuate in the immoral and perverted doctrines of Nietzsche and that these, in a land where all scientific and cultural attainments have for many years been divorced from the deeper religious and even moral elements, should yield a fruitage of barbarity that has shocked the whole world. Such is the outcome of a morally untempered individualism.

At the present moment, the fitful gleams of a better spirit that showed amid the flames of war, in self-denial, comradeship, and sacrifice for the common good seem to have gone out in the darkness of a turbulent social night. Men who but lately fought their way from tyranny seem now under the form of Bolshevism desirous of inflicting upon others a deeper slavery than that from which they themselves have sought escape.

Will the reaction which ever follows in the train of violence bind more firmly the hands of selfish individualism—shall we go forward to out-and-out anarchy, or can the way to a new freedom be won by the coming of a

hitherto scorned and neglected principle.

The outcome of the Roman culture was an institutionalism which subordinated the individual without his consent. The outcome of the Hellenic culture which has held the stage since the Renaissance has subordinated the institution to the individual. May not the hidden demand of the times be an individual who freely contributes his best for the making of humanity?

It has been shown that individualism cannot yield the highest culture because there is in it that element which is hostile to self-discipline. The individual is forever misusing his freedom. What hope for new development in the world can there be except in the discovery by wide masses of men that life becomes great, cultured and joyous only as it forwards the general welfare. If man has gained his unquestioned right to take his life, that is to be master of it, is not the next step in moral progress the free and joyous laying down of life for the common good?

In other words, may not the culture of individualism found in the end to wreck itself by its principle of selfishness give way to the higher culture of personalism?

The dominant principle of personalism is the dependence of individual culture upon the moral and spiritual values. Recognition is given to the fact that any culture which lacks these is lacking in essential humanity and cannot possess a permanent influence over men.

In the following out of this higher individualism it may be necessary for the individual to make the utmost sacrifice of material advantage in order that he may seize upon the finer gifts which are possible to human personality. He may need to sink his individuality in a higher good in order to rise to the heights of personal attainment. The possession of life itself, often held to be the highest good, is seen by personalism to be inferior to the possession, say, of one's honor, or integrity, or self respect. Moreover, if

the well-being of the many demands the self-sacrifice of the individual, the individual reaches his highest possible development by joyful self-surrender. If to be loyal to the highest principles of morality it is necessary to lay down one's life, one by that very act does the thing of greatest cultural value to himself. If, on the other hand, one is to save his life by dishonor, by treason to the moral welfare of himself or others, life would be of little value because unfaithful to those higher interests which alone give it permanent significance. The truth is beautifully expressed in Emerson's lines for the soldier's monument in Cambridge;

'Tis man's perdition to be safe,
When for the truth he ought to die.

In personalism the value of individual culture is not overlooked. It is simply carried to the higher realm of action and here the highest values can be attained only by the highest self-forgetfulness. The culture of personalism leaves no bad taste in the mouth, no pangs or heart-break for others, no blasting or festering trail of evil behind it. It is as benevolent in the general culture as it is in that of the individual.

Never in the history of the world has the battle been so clearly drawn between these conflicting ideals of life. Individualism with its exaltation of individual preferment at the expense of the many, with its ethical doctrine that whatever is useful in furthering its culture is morally justified, with its scorn of the weak and helpless as beyond the pale of its care and responsibility, with its disregard for and skepticism toward all spiritual values, is lined up in a great world conflict against all who believe in the inviolable human rights of the last and feeblest in the social structure.

The personalists, despite their philosophy, their previous condition of cultural servitude, and their previous devotion to individualistic theories are seeing with new vision that no elements are cultural unless they include the well-being of all. The swift lesson is now being taught a slow moving world that when the fundamental human rights of one are menaced the rights of all are endangered. And, better than this, vast multitudes have learned how sweet and beautiful it is to lay down one's life not only for one's country, but for righteousness in the earth, and for the coming Kingdom of God. And just in the measure that men are counting not their lives dear unto themselves in that same measure do they experience the coming of the real Super-man—the man who can lay down his life for his friends.

One would be bold indeed who would propose the solution of the dark problem of evil, and offer a principle on which alone permanent institutions of society may be organized. Yet in these trying days gleams of light are coming to illuminate our way. Not that they have been wanting to other days, but that those which come now are very practical and very personal. We can see how a crisis has been brought upon the world in which if the things dearest to civilization are to be saved many men must voluntarily lay down life. Values superior to life itself have arisen above the horizon of the average human thought. What man in the days just gone was so thoughtless as not to prefer his son dead upon the field of honor to having him a slacker and a sneak—willing to live and prosper through the sacrifice of the noble and brave.

It is impossible that some other lessons of life should fail to follow in the train of this recognition. In days of luxury, comfort, and independence it was easy to listen to the devil of a selfish individualism. One could so easily shut one's ears to the sufferings and injustices of the mul-

titudes. One's personal comfort was so important that any demand of humanity or religion which broke in upon it was considered preposterous. That one should endanger his life for others was the brave act of a fool. At the same time we were obsessed by a fear of suffering and were crying out against a world of pain, demanding that the theists show us the solution of the problem of evil or cease prating about a good God.

In the meantime we are coming to see that the responsibility for the greatest suffering of these times, sufferings that make those of other days seem insignificant, are not the work of God, but of evil and selfish men the world over. Just as the real evil of the world is seen to be the result of an unholy, lustful, and greedy individualism, we are beginning to see likewise that it can be done away and an age of peace brought in only as men are willing to give up everything material for the greatness of a spiritual ideal.

There is in this fact also a suggestion for the solution of the problem of evil so far as it touches the individual. The individual can make the pains and sufferings of life yield him a rich treasure of personal and spiritual attainment, according to the spirit in which he meets them. Death itself may become but the glory which consummates his earthly career.

So much for the individual solution! Where it touches the wider ranges of society it is not so easy. There is much of mystery and darkness. Heavy responsibilities are thrust upon God—why did he make a world of men who could will to evil and to involve the innocent in suffering? Two considerations arrest the attention and constrain us at least to withhold judgment. The first is whether there would be any reality or value to moral freedom if evil were impossible. The second consideration regards the part of God in the matter. Suppose it be

discovered that this life of moral possibility is the superior goal of creation, and that in order to create men in his own spiritual likeness he has himself been willing to partake in their suffering? If the concrete solution of the problem of evil is to be found in the individual attitude toward the woes of life through a spiritual self-mastery that glorifies all, then the endurance of the cross by the Master and Creator of life himself must furnish the philosophical and theological justification of an uncompleted world.

If the world is to move forward to a better day it can only be by an advance from a selfish individualism toward an altruism which brings the highest development of personality.

The new day can come only as the way to it is made by individuals who look upon life from the attitude of the Man of Nazareth to whom the way of the Cross was the way of culture and of power.

I never choose the better part
Until I set the cross up in my heart.

The world civilization has been Roman and it has been Greek. Can it yet be Christian?

A GROUP OF AMERICAN IDEALISTS

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Few teachers of philosophy are widely known beyond the bounds of their own profession and seat of instruction. Yet their influence is exerted upon minds of such a type and at such a period of life that, quietly but formatively, it enters into productive personalities and through them passes into the common life. A large degree of honor and gratitude is due to a group of able philosophical teachers in the history of our American colleges and universities which is almost coterminous with the large number of institutions of higher learning scattered throughout the land.

The brief sketches which follow will serve to indicate the character and quality of the teaching of this company of men and something of the contribution which they have made to the spiritual ideals of the nation.

I.

Not many teachers in this country have done as much for philosophy as well as for his pupils as Professor G. S. Morris, for many years professor of philosophy at Michigan University.

George Sylvester Morris was born at Norwich, Vermont, November 15, 1840, and died at Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 23, 1889.¹ He was a true son of New Eng-

¹The admirable biography of Professor Morris by Professor R. M. Wenley (University of Michigan Publications, 1917) to which I am indebted for the material of this sketch is an example of what should be done in the case of other of our philosophers.

land Congregationalism, acquisitive, conscientious, religious. His mind and heart were early set toward the ministry, and after graduating from Dartmouth College in 1861—followed by a two years' service in the Union Army and a year of tutorship at Dartmouth College—he entered Union Theological Seminary. Here began a period of questioning—the first waves of the sea of doubt which was surging in upon the youth of that period, and a turning toward philosophy as the means by which these problems might be met. Leaving the seminary midway in his course, upon the advice of that broad-minded member of the faculty, Professor Henry B. Smith, Morris went to Germany and spent several years in the study of philosophy under Ulrici, Trendelenberg and others. Upon his return, while awaiting an appointment to teach, and in the initial years of his work in Michigan University—to which he was called in 1870 as professor of Modern Languages and Literature—he went through a severe mental struggle in the effort to adjust the pressure of the incoming scientific and religious ideas to his early faith. Gradually he won through to a clear and tested unity of thought, philosophical and religious. Upon his appointment to the position of Lecturer in Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University and to the Chair of Ethics at Michigan he soon began to gain a widening influence. Before his death he had become “one of the chief philosophical teachers of America.”²

The quality and extent of the influence of Professor Morris over his pupils was due, as his biographer makes clear, to the strength and earnestness of his convictions as well as to the clarity of his thinking and the charm of his expression. “In him religious faith and philosophic knowledge was one—vitality and indistinguishably one,”

²—Macbride Sterrett, (*Op. cit.*, p. 296).

his pupil John Dewey said of him.³ This judgment of Professor Dewey reflects his own statement: "The philosophical and the religious conception run hand in hand."

The first volume of Professor Morris—aside from his translation of Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy* (1872) was "British Thought and Thinkers" (1880), a searching criticism of the materialistic features of British philosophy. His second volume was entitled "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Exposition" (1882), a work of blended interpretation and criticism. It reveals the Hegelian trend of his thinking and leaves the hesitant Kant far behind in its conception of God, who is here termed the Larger Self.

This larger self is divine, it is universal, living, effective reason, it is absolute Spirit. The individual's sufficiency "to think anything of himself" is, thus, of God. It comes from his participation in a light which can be, in its completeness, no less all-embracing and all-creative than divine reason.⁴

In this third volume "Philosophy and Christianity," the Ely Lectures of Union Theological Seminary (1883), we have what is unquestionably one of the few successful attempts in the history of American philosophy to interpret the philosophical meaning and significance of Christianity. This is done on the basis of the Hegelian metaphysic which lends itself with almost too great ease to this purpose. The discussion is free and original and is accompanied by a sympathetic and untrammelled use and interpretation of Biblical passages by no means common in philosophical literature. The point of view is colored by the Hegelian idea of faith as "abbreviated knowledge"—rather than

³Professor Morris took an active part in church life. He was confirmed in St. Andrew's Episcopal Church in Ann Arbor in 1873, and at the time of his death was senior warden.

⁴Wenley, *Op. cit.*, p. 269.

adventurous knowledge—but this depreciation of religious knowledge is not pressed into the service of pure intellectualism, as it is in extreme Hegelianism. Strong emphasis is laid upon personality.

What man, therefore, through his personality, is finitely, imperfectly, dependently, that God—the Absolute—is infinitely, perfectly, independently. . . . Upon any other than the spiritualistic (and experimental) view of the nature of absolute being, the plurality of particular, finite existence is reduced to the rank of a mere insubstantial phenomenon, or of a mere irresponsible ‘bubble on the ocean of existence’ as pantheists like to express it.⁵

Such assertions make it evident that the author’s Hegelianism was by no means controlling or restrictive. Indeed, as Professor Dewey writes of him: “His adherence to Hegel (I feel quite sure) was because Hegel had demonstrated to him, in a great variety of fields of experience, the supreme reality of this principle of a living unity maintaining itself through the medium of differences and distinctions.”⁶

Perhaps the most significant fact in this comprehensive study of Christianity is the complete accord of the lecturer with the Christocentric conception of Christianity. This appears in such passages as the following:

That the subject-matter of this knowledge (of God and Eternal Life) is written in infinitely larger, more legible and unmistakable characters ‘in the face of Jesus Christ’ than anywhere else, I do not hesitate, in the name of Philosophy, to assert.⁷

Referring to Paul’s enthusiastic affirmation: “In him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” he remarks:

⁵P. 88.

⁶Wenley, *Op. cit.* p. 317.

⁷P. 269.

That this saying of St. Paul is a true one, that Christ is indeed 'the Truth' that the spiritual knowledge of him is the key to all absolute intelligence, and that in this knowledge lies the indispensable way to man's perfection, to his true, self-mastering Freedom and to eternal Life,—of all this I am profoundly convinced.⁸

Such a volume as this makes one wish that the author's desire might have been fulfilled: "I wish I had two lives, one to devote to Philosophy, the other to Theology."

II.

Another of the finest American exponents of idealism was Henry A. P. Torrey, for thirty-two years (1868-1902) professor of philosophy in the University of Vermont. In many respects Professor Torrey resembled Professor Morris. Their faces showed the same intellectual refinement, the same courage, gentleness and high purposes. He, too, studied at Union Theological Seminary, completing his course in 1864 and was for three years thereafter pastor of the Congregational church at Vergennes, Vermont. Thence by reason of inherent fitness, readily discernible, he was called to his professorship. Upon assuming his post he at once plunged into a study of Kant in the original and by virtue of a philosophic mind and a native aptitude for teaching, fitted himself to become one of those rare benefactors who, as has been said of him, "teach their pupils not only to know but to become."

Professor Torrey published very little with the exception of a translation and selection of Descartes' works, whose fine quality was widely recognized. In the year 1885, however, he wrote for the Andover Review a series of three articles on "The Theodicée of Leibnitz," which

⁸P. 275.

⁹Wenley, Op. cit., p. 174.

constitute a contribution to the literature of philosophy by no means slight. They reveal the rare power of careful analysis and explication which his students found in him, as well as what has been well termed the "judicial character of his mind."

Reticent and conservative as he customarily was in stating his own philosophical convictions, at the conclusion of these papers he expresses himself in no uncertain tone in favor of the *validity of the truth of intuition*, thus aligning himself, though with entire independence, with his predecessor, James Marsh, and the "Burlington philosophy." The way in which this conclusion is reached is characteristic. Having made a clear and careful study of the *Theodicée* and having pointed out the challenging fact that there is a problem of evil, but no problem of good—good exciting no surprise and demanding no explanation—he continues:

When hard pressed by the difficulties which arise from the presence of evil, we accordingly betake ourselves to the shelter and illumination which our moral intuitions afford. We decline to pass judgment on what takes place in the sphere of perception and experience without taking into account what is necessarily and eternally true. The good is supreme in idea, and what is supreme ideally shall prove itself supreme in reality. . . . That what is true for intuition shall become true for perception, that what is in its own nature real and supreme shall finally assert its truth and reveal its supremacy in the sphere of experience, is not merely the hope, but the indestructible belief of the human heart. This is affirmation, indeed, and not argument, but it is, nevertheless, rational, for it is affirmation of the same sort as that upon which all reasoning finally rests.¹⁰

Here is a perspicuous glimpse into Professor Torrey's careful and mature conception of truth and into the work-

ing of his mind. He was not only an intuitionist, but in his own guarded and reserved way, a mystic. He did not have to struggle with doubt, or to win his faith by a slow and painful process, as did Professor Morris. "He could remember very clearly, he said, the moment of his illumination. To him walking in the woods in spring, alone and brooding, there came, suddenly and definitely, a clear shining, in the light of which the things of the spirit came into harmonious and vital relation, and that light grew and did not pass."¹¹ It was this reasoned reliance upon intuition, coupled with his judicial mental reserve, which held him back from that degree of consent to Hegelianism which so distinctly colored American philosophy in the later nineteenth century. He was a firm upholder of the testimony of consciousness. Nor would he assent to Kant's skepticism concerning the validity of our rational faculties, even in the interest of moral reason—as the writer well remembers when as a pupil of Professor Torrey, in the callowness of youth, he sought to win his approval of the Kantian agnosticism. He was as deaf to this as to the siren persuasions of Hegelian unity at the expense of the duality to which he could not blind himself. With intelligent tenacity he held fast to what he regarded as the fundamental principles of consciousness, refusing to be swept away from these moorings. Yet he was no mere frigid and impassioned arbitrator between conflicting systems. Like Morris, he was a great truth-lover, burning with quiet ardor for the truth—yet never with a hectic or superficial flame. He was a fine example of the apostle's saying, "The spirits of the prophets are subject unto the prophets."

To Professor Torrey as to so many other American idealists the realities of personality were the major factors

¹⁰Andover Review, Vol. IV, pp. 509-510.

¹¹*In Memoriam*, Henry A. P. Torrey, LL.D., p. 26.

of reality. It was with great pertinence that his life-long friend, Dean Edward H. Griffin of Johns Hopkins University, said of him:

If you were to seek to indicate in a single word the predominant thought in Professor Torrey's mind as a teacher and thinker, it may perhaps be expressed in the word *personality*. So thoroughly was he persuaded that the self-determination of a rational and ethical being is the highest and noblest thing in the universe, that he could not look with tolerance upon any view, in respect to man, or in respect to God, which seemed to him to invalidate or to obscure this concept.¹²

III.

A fine aroma of student admiration and gratitude lingers about the name of Amherst's beloved teacher of philosophy, Charles Edward Garman, who, like his predecessor, Julius Seelye, enriched the lives of the students of that well-known college by his personality as well as by his teaching.¹³ As a teacher he was so filled with idealism, so absorbed in the love of philosophy, and above all so engrossed in the life of his students, that his life was consumed in unreserved self-sacrifice. The result reveals, in the words of William James, how "a life modestly consecrated to what nowadays seems the less fashionable half of a professor's functions, may yet reap its meed of fame, and burst, in spite of itself, into the wider publicity."¹⁴ This appears in the letter written by him to President G.

¹²Memoir cited, p. 12.

¹³Professor Garman was born December 18, 1850, in Limington, Maine, when his father was pastor of the Congregational Church. He entered Amherst College in 1872, graduating in 1876, and after a period of teaching, studied at Yale Divinity School under Samuel Harris and George P. Fisher. In 1880 he became instructor in Mathematics in Amherst College, in 1882 Associate Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, and in 1889 full professor, continuing in this position until his death in 1907.

¹⁴Letters, Lectures and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman, p. 598.

Stanley Hall of Clark University, which is prefixed to the volume, "Studies in Philosophy and Psychology," commemorative of the twenty-five years of service of Professor Garman as teacher of philosophy in Amherst College. It is a revealing letter. From it I take the following:

It is my conviction that a young man can obtain inspiration, enthusiasm, absence of self-consciousness only by the steady contemplation of great truths. . . . The young man who philosophizes, who really understands himself and appreciates the truth, is no longer a slave of form, but is filled with admiration that is genuine and lasting.

Mr. Garman's early predilection was for the philosophy of intuition. "His graduating speech ("The Spiritual Philosophy") was an earnest plea for the main point of Hickok's psychology—the supremacy of the 'reason' over the understanding and the absolute need of the intuitive faculty."¹⁵ From Intuitionism he passed into Monism. The publication of the memorial volume, "Letters, Lectures and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman" (1909) revealed his final point of view as that of an intensely spiritual Monism which is at the same time thoroughly rational and scientific. "God or Spirit," he writes "is the only independent reality, and any other being or event is but a dependent 'phase' or 'state' or 'product' of His activity. He is 'the all in all'."¹⁶

Spirit is the only substance in the universe, and material force is one mode of its manifestation and constant activity. How can we know more of this spirit? We answer, that since the entire universe is dependent upon it, we who are part of the universe, like it, live and move and have our being in it (Him). If we try to study its (His) mode of action outside ourselves we can only use the senses and obtain *phenomena*. But if we look within, we have the real

¹⁵Op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 247.

noumenal spirit revealed in our own consciousness.
. . . *Both thought and things must be phases of one
and the same Universal Spirit.*¹⁷

This interpretation of the material world as a phase of the Universal Spirit is an evidence of the spiritualizing quality of Professor Garman's mind, but it exhibits a certain lack of discrimination.

The material world, while it serves as a marvelous medium and instrument of the Spirit, has a certain nature of its own and is by no means in perfect harmony with Spirit. It seems to have had its source from Spirit, to be striving toward Spirit and to find its highest end in serving Spirit. But to make it a *phase* of Spirit is to drag Spirit down to a lower level and to confuse moral and spiritual values.

IV.

Less contemplative and reflective, more forceful and assertive and much more widely known than the men whom we have been considering was that vigorous and well-furnished champion of Idealism, Professor Bowne.

Borden Parker Bowne was a native of New Jersey, where he was born at Leonardville, Jan. 14, 1847. He graduated at the University of New York and studied philosophy from 1873 to 1875 at the universities of Halle, Paris and Göttingen. He was for a year on the staff of the New York *Independent* and from 1876 until his death in 1910, he was professor of Philosophy at Boston University and Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.¹⁸ He was also Chairman of the Philosophical Conference at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences.

A true Kantian, Bowne owed much also to Lotze, but was in no sense a mere follower of either. As a Kantian he was independent and critical. Not only did he do his

¹⁷Ibid., p. 258.

own thinking, but in presenting his views he had all the fervor and effectiveness of a Methodist preacher directed toward the intelligent propagation of a spiritualizing philosophy. He had a firm faith in the mission of philosophy, clearly set forth in the first chapter of his "Personalism." He possessed also a complete command of his subject. To his students, his audiences and his readers, in a time of great intellectual uncertainty and confusion, he brought what was hardly less than a saving philosophical faith.

His main doctrines were; idealism, developmentalism and personalism. His idealism,—defined in his "Metaphysics" (1882) and "Theory of Thought and Knowledge" (1898)—accompanied Kant as far as the constructive power of the mind in knowledge is concerned, but parted with him when the latter denied that such knowledge is genuine and valid. His own definition of reality as "that which acts or is acted upon" is as satisfying as it is simple, provided there is due recognition of the fact that a lower order of reality is involved in being acted upon than manifests itself in action.

As a philosophical interpreter of Evolution, he belongs with that forceful group of American thinkers including Asa Gray, E. D. Cope, Charles Woodruff Shields, John Fiske and Joseph Le Conte who rescued the doctrine from the materialistic evolutionism of Herbert Spencer and Huxley and gave it its true spiritual significance. In this respect Professor Bowne—representing and speaking, as he did, to a great body of Christians—accomplished a notable service. The distinction which he drew between Naturalism as a scientific method and Naturalism as a philosophic doctrine (in the chapter on God and Nature of the volume "The Immanence of God" (1905) and also in "Personalism"¹⁹ was most timely and luminous and helped

¹⁹For a study of Bowne's philosophy see Ralph T. Flewelling: *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy*.

¹⁹Pp. 219—.

greatly to dissipate the unfortunate misunderstanding which had arisen regarding the materialistic implications of the evolutionary hypothesis.

The dominant and most characteristic note of Professor Bowne's philosophy is his emphasis upon that which constitutes the title of his strongest and best-known volume, "Personalism," (consisting of a series of lectures delivered upon the N. W. Harris foundation at Northwestern University in 1908). The foregleams of this pronounced Personalism appeared in his earlier volumes, especially "Theism" (1902)—the principal contention of which is that the "World-Ground," as he terms God, is personal. The term "World-Ground" is itself hardly consonant with personality, and yet it served a good purpose in that it avoided those anthropomorphic implications in the Supreme Person suggested by "Creator," "Ruler" and similar terms. At the same time it is a broader conception than that of "First Cause" and less all-consuming than "Absolute."

The theism of Professor Bowne is a great advance in philosophic breadth and acumen over the conventional theism which it helped to supplant. He was one of the foremost interpreters of the Divine Immanence, and none did more to raise this leading conception of the New Theology into its now accepted place than he. His little volume on this theme has done much to clarify and restore this ancient doctrine of Greek Christianity. The discussion of "Immanent Providence" in the chapter "God in History" is perhaps the sanest corrective of crude and commonplace conceptions of Providence which has appeared in the theological literature of America.

It is in his "Personalism" however, that Dr. Bowne rendered his chief service both to philosophy and religion—a volume which has taken its place as one of the outstanding products of American Idealism. The two closing chap-

ters, "The Failure of Impersonalism" and "The Personal World" constitute a forceful statement, at once critical and constructive, of the foundations of a philosophy of person-ality. Man can be understood only as a person, "an inhabitant of the invisible world, who projects his thought and life on the great space and time screen we call nature."²⁰ "Personality is the real and only principle of philosophy which will enable us to take any rational step whatever."²¹ The Divine Being must be personal in order to account for his relation to the external world and to ourselves.

The problem of knowledge is insoluble except as we maintain the freedom of both the finite and the infinite spirit. That all things depend on God is a necessary affirmation of thought, but that all things and thoughts and activities are divine is unintelligible in the first place and self-destructive in the next. . . . What is God's relation as thinking our thoughts to God as thinking the absolute and perfect thought? . . . Does he lose himself in the finite, so as not to know what and who he is, or does he perhaps exhaust himself in the finite so that the finite is all there is? . . . But if all the while he has perfect knowledge of himself as one and infinite, how does this illusion of the finite arise at all in that perfect unity and perfect light? . . . These difficulties can never be escaped so long as we seek to identify the finite and the infinite. Their mutual otherness is necessary if we are to escape the destruction of all thought and life. . . . Religion demands the mutual otherness of the finite and infinite, in order that the relation of love and obedience may obtain. Both love and religion seek for union, but it is not the union of absorption or fusion, but rather the union of mutual understanding and sympathy, which would disappear if the otherness of the persons were removed. . . . The extravagant lan-

²⁰Personalism, p. 263.

²¹Ibid., pp. 282-284.

guage of mysticism on this point is the expression of religious desire and is never to be taken literally.²²

The outlines of a philosophy of personality are present in this notable volume in clear and comprehensive form, together with a trenchant criticism of opposing systems. It is true that many of the deeper problems of personality are untouched. The knowledge we have of other persons is not satisfactorily presented when it is described thus:

For each person his own self is known in immediate experience and all others are known through their effects. They are not revealed in form or shape, but in deeds, and they are known only in and through deeds.²³

Were we dependent upon their deeds alone to assure ourselves of the reality and individuality of other persons, our knowledge of them would be but a meagre and haphazard one. Deeds confirm or correct, alter and enlarge our knowledge of other persons, but they can hardly be said to initiate or comprise it.

It remains for others to advance the boundaries of the philosophy of which Professor Bowne was so successful a pioneer and protagonist. Happily also he was one of the few american philosophers who passed naturally and without strain,—taking his philosophy with him—into the sphere of theology proper, where he exercised a most salutary and liberating influence. His theological writings are environed by no alien atmosphere, as of one invading another sphere than his own. “Studies in Christianity” (1909) as well as his little volume “Atonement” (1900) and “The Immanence of God,” already referred to, place him among those who have done most to emancipate and broaden American theology.

²²Ibid., p. 277.

²³Op., cit. p. 269.

A BRITISH ESTIMATE OF DR. BOWNE

DR. JAMES IVERACH

Former students and friends of Doctor Bowne will be interested in the following estimate upon his work from the pen of Dr. James Iverach, Principal of the United Free Church College in Aberdeen, widely known authority on Theism, of whom Dr. James Hastings in a personal letter to the Editor declares that he "knows as much about modern philosophy as any man in the British Isles."

The estimate of Doctor Bowne is in the form of a letter to Dr. Hastings which we are privileged to publish.

Aberdeen, 7th Jan'y, 1920.

Dear Dr. Hastings:

In 1882 a volume of Professor Bowne came into my hands and interested me so much that I kept a sharp lookout for any further writings from his pen. The title of that volume is "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer." It was the fullest and most able of the criticisms of Spencer which I had met, and it still occupies the first rank. Essays on Theism next attracted me. Afterwards I found his volume of Metaphysics. It was an exceedingly able book, but its dependence on Lotze was obvious. In fact, it might be described as Lotze stripped of his excessive verbiage and done into English. A more independent work appeared in 1887 called the "Philosophy of Theism," and notwithstanding the numerous Gifford Lectures bearing on Theism, it retains its freshness and its cogency.

He has written also an "Introduction to Psychological Theory," a "Treatise on Ethics," both of which I highly value, and which have proved exceedingly useful in my work. After many years of reflection on philosophical

questions, Bowne in 1898 published a revised edition of his *Metaphysics*, in which he dealt with metaphysics proper, leaving out all epistemological questions. When one compares the first edition with the revised, one can see how far in advance the second is; and observe how Bowne has attained to clearness and self-mastery. He dealt independently with Epistemology in the volume "*Theory of Thought and Knowledge*," and this is perhaps the greatest of his works. It was very helpful to me when I was writing Epistemology for you in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. There is also the volume on "*Personalism*" which you yourself reviewed.

I have not time to give you an estimate of the value of Bowne's contribution to Philosophy and Theology. He is of all one of the foremost of American thinkers of my time. I have known Royce and James and I have read for many years the *Philosophical Review*, and from it have learned much of present tendencies in philosophy in the States, but in my judgment Bowne is the equal of any other thinker in his knowledge of the history of philosophy, in the keenness of his intellectual grasp, and in the clearness of his exposition. His contribution to Theism is of the highest value.

I am sorry that I cannot write in greater fullness.

I am

Yours very truly,

JAMES IVERACH.

PERSONALISM: A VITAL PHILOSOPHY

FRANK WILBUR COLLIER

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James Hastings said, "Bowne came by way of philosophy to believe in the God of the Bible."¹ This distinguished and generally accurate scholar made a serious mistake here. Those who know the personal history of Bowne know that it is not true, and those who understand his philosophy would not expect to find this statement to be true.

Dr. Bowne was brought up in a Christian community in which there was a Christian church, and his was a Christian family. Hence he breathed in the great fundamental and even traditional teachings of Protestant Christianity from his childhood. His attitude towards life when he left home for college was not very much different from that of the average boy brought up in a Christian home where God is taken for granted, and where the religious attitude is part of the atmosphere of the home. So the late Dr. George P. Fisher of Yale University expressed the truth when he said that Bowne's "Theism" "presents in a condensed but lucid form the mature thoughts of an able and learned philosophical scholar *on the foundations of religious faith.*" And the very first things which came from his pen and found their way into print were in defense of the Christian doctrine of a personal God and of other fundamental things of Christianity.²

¹Expository Times, November, 1915, p. 85.

²The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, 1874, pp. 23, 226, 258.

When young Bowne was finishing his course in New York University he had done such brilliant work in his different studies that almost every one of his teachers tried to persuade him to follow the respective teacher's particular line; but Bowne chose philosophy, and there are good reasons to believe that he made this choice because of his interest in religion. Dr. Charles Parkhurst, former Editor of *Zion's Herald*, said in his article on Dr. Bowne in the *Boston Evening Transcript*: "Dr. Bowne's interest in religion is even deeper than his interest in philosophy," and he adds, "Professor Bowne says that he is a born fanatic, but escaped becoming such by having an extra heavy balance-wheel of good sense attached to his machinery. Without this he would have become a fanatical mystic and a mystical fanatic, an uncompromising rigorist and a vigorist. It is because he understands this fanaticism so well that he is so trenchant and effective in dealing with it. A vein of saving common sense and of humor runs through all his writings—here a phrase, there an epithet or sly allusion, an echo from Scripture or literature lighting up many a difficult discussion and making many a point clear which otherwise would be obscure. This is more prominent still in personal intercourse. There is a deep Puritan vein of conscience, a contempt and a loathing for sham, pretense and unmanliness, but the whole is made human and no less effective by the continuous play of humor essentially sunny and optimistic." Almost all of the characteristics here mentioned by Dr. Parkhurst require time for development, and they are generally imbibed in childhood. This is especially true of quotations and allusions to Scripture.

Stress is laid upon this matter because it is fundamental in Bowne's system of philosophy that the experience of living men comes first, and reflective thought follows. He defined philosophy as "an attempt to give an account

of experience, or it is a man's way of looking at things,"⁸ It is the interpretation of experience.⁴ Life was always the big thing with Bowne. As he used to say, "Life is larger than logic." He contrasted what Matthew Arnold called the method of rigor and vigor with what he called the living method, saying, "the former assumes everything to be false until proved true; the latter takes things at their own report, or as they seem until proved false. All fruitful work proceeds on the latter method; most speculative criticism and closet philosophy proceed on the former. Hence their perennial barrenness."⁵ Thus the actual method of living men is to "take our experience as a datum, at once indeducible and undeniable, and seek to interpret it for our own rational peace and satisfaction."⁶ It is for this reason that we have many beliefs which are not held because we have proved them, but which we try to prove because we hold them, and which we insist on holding whether we can prove them or not."⁷ And this is justified because life is the sacred thing, and in reality life is only found in the individual; and the individual person for Bowne⁸ as for Christ⁹ is the only sacred thing on this earth. It is interesting to note that Kant in that section of his *Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason* in which he shows that his moral system is in harmony with that of Christianity holds that man is sacred, being "an end in himself."¹⁰

Life as it is experienced by the individual person is the basal thing. But immediately second to it is the interpretation of experience. This is what is called philosophy. As Browne puts it: "Philosophy is simply an attempt to give an account of experience, or it is a man's way of

⁴Personalism, p. 4. ⁵Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 3.

⁶Theism, p. 16. ⁷ibid., 35. ⁸ibid., 35.

⁹Principles of Ethics, pp. 199-203, 209, 252. ¹⁰Lk. 15:3-31.

¹¹Kant's Critique of the Practical Reason, Tr. by T. K. Abbott, p. 229.

looking at things.”¹¹ Man being a self-conscious being cannot but reflect, too often very crudely, but nevertheless he does reflect upon his experience. And so even the most ignorant person has his philosophy. As Bowne says: “Every man has a philosophy of some sort, wittingly or unwittingly.” The only question is the kind of philosophy one has. “It is not, then, a question of having or not having a philosophy, but of having a good or a bad one. And this question is of great importance, for, while a good philosophy may not have much positive value, a bad one may do measureless harm. Nations may be paralyzed, and individuals may be wrecked, by a fatalistic and pessimistic philosophy.”¹² Henry Jones agrees with Bowne in this matter and expresses himself in equally clear language: “The only choice we can have is between a conscious metaphysics and an unconscious one, between hypotheses which we have examined and whose limitations we know, and hypotheses which rule us from behind, as pure prejudices do. It is because of this that the empiricist is so dogmatic, and the ignorant man so certain of the truth of his opinions.”¹³

So far, then, two points are clear in Bowne’s living method. Men do and must live before they philosophize: they eat, drink, work, enjoy pleasure, and suffer pain. But it is also true that very early in the history of the race and of individuals men begin to reflect upon just what is the meaning of all this eating, drinking, working, enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain. That is, first they must have the experience, and then they find that they instinctively try to understand the experience. But the reflective faculty develops very slowly. As Tennyson expresses it: “Science moves, but slowly slowly, creeping on from point

¹¹Personalism, p. 4.

¹²Personalism, pp. 4-6.

¹³Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher, 35.

to point." In the meanwhile men must live, and so they cannot wait for the development of reflective thought; for life is much more than the logical understanding. As Bowne says: "Man is still, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far more powerful factors than the logical understanding. Man is also a practical being, in highly complex interaction with his fellows and with the system of things. Before he argues he must live; before he speculates he must come to some sort of practical understanding with himself, and with his neighbors, and with the physical order."¹⁴ That is, philosophy, when it seeks to be something more than logic-chopping, and endeavors to keep in touch with reality and life, must remember that life is always the end and logic can be but a means; for the function of logic "is not to create life or even to justify it, but to formulate it, to understand it, and to help it to self-knowledge."¹⁵ This is the actual way living men approach all their problems; and no doubt Bowne, being one of these living men, approached philosophy, as do all men, with all the beliefs which he inherited in the home, in the church, and in the community. Here we see the great significance of institutions for human development.¹⁶ They are the organs of social heredity; and it is through them that the great catholic beliefs of the race, and the conceptions and customs which represent the net result of the thought and experience of the race become the law of the individual.¹⁷

It may seem very shocking to those who imagine that they begin with the self-evident and only move by the sure steps of proof to be told that the method just described is the actual method of living men; and to be told that the

¹⁴Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 376.

¹⁵Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 383.

¹⁶Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 372.

¹⁷Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 372; Personalism, p. 311.

great philosopher Bowne did not come by way of philosophy to believe in the God of the Bible, but came to philosophy to try to understand the belief which he held in the God of the Bible. They will say that all of this is nothing short of a confession that one approaches the great problems of life with bias and prejudice. This is certainly the way men do approach the great problems of life; and for the simple reason that they cannot approach them any other way. Those who claim that it is possible for men to put aside all bias and personal interest are either not ingenuous or they simply do not know life. Bowne knew it was not possible, and not only said so, but insisted upon it, and made it a basal principle in his system of philosophy. It is interesting to know that this living method of the philosopher Bowne is confirmed by the historian and statesman Bryce: "Every one is of course predisposed to see things in some one particular light by his previous education, habits of mind, accepted dogmas, religious or social affinities, notions of his own personal interest. No event, no speech or article, ever falls upon a perfectly virgin soil: the reader or listener is always more or less biased already. When some important event happens, which calls for the formation of a view, these pre-existing habits, dogmas, affinities, help to determine the impression which each man experiences, and so far are factors in the views he forms."¹⁸

The life of men is dominated by their ideals; and these they receive in the community in which they dwell, and they speak with authority, "and on any theory of knowledge they must be allowed to stand, unless there be some positive disproof."¹⁹ This inherited stock of community ideas are necessary for life; and every one bows to their authority to a greater or less degree; for as Bowne says,

¹⁸James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, vol. ii, 253.

¹⁹*Personalism*, p. 311.

"Men in general must live by authority. It is only the use of such abstractions as thought or reason which hides it from us."²⁰ And life has become so complex that even the greatest minds cannot investigate every field of thought, and thus they must depend to a very large degree upon the authority of the community. The reason for this is clear. The authority of the community arises from the strength of its practical beliefs, and these are the product of the necessities of life itself. This is why Bowne says that "the great catholic beliefs of humanity become expressions of reality itself, and on any theory of knowledge they must be allowed to stand, unless there be some positive disproof."²¹ And this is the province of logic—to criticize, amend, and in case of positive disproof to reject any belief. This is Bowne's living method.

It is evident now that Bowne was a Personalist from the beginning. By Personalism he meant that the Ultimate Reality, and indeed all reality, as distinguished from appearance, is Personal Intelligence.²² Having been born and brought up in a Christian home and in a Christian community he inherited the belief in a personal God, which is not only the God of the Bible, but which, as F. B. Jevons says, has always been the God of religion.²³ This great catholic belief is what he began with, and as he progressed in his philosophical study, he not only never found any reason that suggested positive disproof, but on the contrary everything led back to personal intelligence as the source of all things. The impressiveness of this grew until he reached the point where he was not satisfied with any one of a number of terms which he suggested, "provided the thing be understood," and finally adopted the

²⁰Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 373.

²¹Personalism, p. 311.

²²Personalism, pp. 157, 158, 265, 266.

²³Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion p. 136.

term Personalism which he gave to his last philosophical work, the A. W. Harris Lectures, published two years before his lamented death. But from the publication of his first work in 1874, in which he objected to the system of Herbert Spencer because in it there "is no personal God,"²⁴ until we received the last formal philosophical treatise of this great thinker, his claim was that "nature and history both, more and more clearly testify to

'One God that ever lives and loves;
One law, one life, one element;
And one far-off, divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.' "

This living method of Bowne neither discounts life as experienced nor does it discount the rights of the intellect or of formal logic. Hence while he could have little sympathy with modern Pragmatism as a theory of truth, his doctrine of the practical nature of belief which we have said so much about, and which is so fundamental in his system, has very close affinity with what Prof. W. E. Hocking calls "critical pragmatism," and which is the fruitful factor in modern pragmatism.²⁵ As a protest against the artificial and barren method of an overwrought intellectualism Pragmatism has been of service; but all the good in it is found in Bowne's doctrine of the practical nature of belief. The trouble with modern pragmatism is that it is an extreme development of Kant's doctrine of the supremacy of the practical reason, and like all extremes, the outcome is, to say the least, very obscure. James said he might be forced to "a sort of polytheism," but he did not pretend to defend it, and in another place he said there could be no objection to this, "provided we be only allowed to believe that the divine principle remains

²⁴The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, pp. 23, 226, 258-269.

²⁵The Meaning of God in Human Experience, xiii.

supreme, and that the others are subordinate."²⁶ The brilliant and genial James is unfortunate in the use of the term polytheism, for as Bowne says, "Polytheism implies a plurality of independent beings."²⁷ And they are certainly not independent if the divine principle remains supreme. Nor is the replacing of polytheism with pluralism in his later works less unfortunate, especially as Prof. James was reaching out to touch the popular mind. As to his actual position Prof. James, after reading Bowne's "Personalism" wrote the latter, saying that their positions were the same, they differed only in terminology. And Dr. Bowne told the writer that this was true. As to James's agreeing with Bowne in his doctrine of the practical nature of belief, there can be no doubt.

Buffon said, "The style is the man. Hence it cannot rise of itself, or change or shift. If it be noble, sublime, and elevated, the author will be admired similarly in all time; for truth is durable, aye, eternal." Bowne's style is always elevated, it is noble when the subject is noble, and in certain sections of his "Metaphysics," "Theism," "Personalism," and "Studies in Christianity" it becomes sublime. Of course, the reason is the subjects treated are sublime, and the author has the mental and moral greatness to appreciate them. But the profoundest truths are the great commonplace truths by which the individual and the race live. Not the ordinary man, nor indeed very many of the extraordinary men, can give expression to them; but when one who understands them and has lived them gives expression to them the great heart of humanity recognizes them and responds. For Bowne did live his philosophy, as he held that the purpose of philosophy was to help us to understand life and to formulate life; and

²⁶William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 526, compare p. 132.

²⁷Theism, 289.

so he gave us a vital and a vitalizing philosophy. As Eucken said, Bowne's works read like personal confessions; and we have known those who have used his "Metaphysics" as devotional reading. Personalism is a philosophy which springs from human life, and is intended for human life. Hence it is devoid of the volubility, artificiality, and rigidity which make so many volumes on philosophy so barren and repulsive to the average intelligent person.

THE COMMON THREAD IN FRENCH AND
ENGLISH CULTURE

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The recent war has brought together in the closest alliance for the reconstruction of a war-torn world the English-speaking and Romance peoples. Among the five nations who have ruled the Council at Paris, two are English-speaking and two are Latin or Romance. The question which arises in the mind of the thinking man is: Will the alliance hold, or is it a mere temporary conjunction which will easily fall asunder? Those brought up in the German school of thought, who were taught to begin the study of English literature, not with Chaucer and Shakespeare, but with Beowulf, have regarded the tie between the Anglo-Saxon and the Teuton as vital and essential, that between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin as accidental and temporary. English culture has never given in to the German propaganda, which it regards as in the final issue based on linguistic studies, which are in the domain of science proper rather than of civilization. Chaucer bore a French name, and his canons of poetic law were absolutely at one with French and Italian traditions. Shakespeare also is so Italian in his themes and his handling of them that the wonder is he never visited Italy. And the book which has fixed canons of rhythmic beauty in language more than even Shakespeare, the Authorized Version of the Bible, is rhythmically and æsthetically a successor of the noble Vulgate Latin version of Jerome. Matthew Arnold, with a sure instinct for literary charm,

would even at times turn to the sonorous phrases of the Vulgate as even more telling and weighty than their English equivalents.

Modern science has been accustomed to regard these æsthetic traditions and affinities as merely accidental and disturbing in the investigation of human progress. The scientific student of political economy—rightly termed at Oxford, as taught by the scientific school, the “dry and dismal study”—started from the base that an advantageous code of social action may be determined irrespectively of the influence of social affection. Regarding the human being merely as a covetous machine, developed from the amoeba and the ape, he would bid us examine by what laws of labor, purchase and sale the community may accumulate the largest amount of wealth. The only stable and constant elements in human nature being avarice and the desire for progress, other elements like religion, morals and art are so far negligible.

Unfortunately for this reasoning, which has imposed itself as final truth not only upon individual thinkers and coteries, but also upon nations, these merely “extra” elements in the social problem cannot be treated under the same law as the supposed constant elements; they alter the essence of the creature under examination the moment they are added. The man religiously moved becomes “a new creature; old things are passed away; behold all things are become new.” The really vital things in life are, in fact, not those supposed constants, but the rejected “disturbing elements,” which demand new canons entirely, in the three domains of religion, morals and art. These canons appeal not to the intellect but to the emotions; since we are not what we think, but what we trust in, what we love, what we admire. The Maker of men, as Ruskin rightly remarks, intended that human actions should be guided, not by balances of expediency, but of justice. Ex-

pediency is of the intellect, justice is of the heart.

There have been three great social movements in Europe during the past four centuries: the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the period of Illuminism in Germany, of which Lessing, Schiller and pre-eminently Goethe were the exponents. Two of these were intellectual and practically pagan; the men of the Renaissance reverted to ancient Greece for all their canons of truth, and thus broke with Christian revelation, and with Christian ethics. In doing this they also broke with Christian art. And the center of all art is not painting nor music, nor sculpture, nor the decorative; but poetry and the life of the higher law. In his discussion of this theme in the "Epilogue to Lessing's *Laocoon*," Matthew Arnold, prince of critics, who knew and appreciated modern life and art, strikes the true note:

No painter yet hath such a way,
Nor no musician made, as they,
And gather'd on immortal knolls
Such lovely flowers for cheering souls.
Beethoven, Raphael, cannot reach
The charm which Homer, Shakespeare, teach.
To these, to these, their thankful race
Gives then, the first, the fairest place;
And brightest is their glory's sheen,
For greatest hath their labor been.

To them must be added the author of Job and the Nine-tieth and other Psalms, Isaiah, and the inspired writers down to St. John, who have given Hebrew literature its unique place in the development of the higher life of mankind. Narrow in many of its aspects, the Reformation remained true to the central element in our civilization and art, the consecrated life and the poetry which nourishes it. It was a reaction and a needed reaction against the chilling paganism of the Renaissance.

When Germany began to seek after national thought and expression in the eighteenth century, after two hundred years of disunion and backwardness—except in music—its leaders decided to build, not on any past, whatever its high authority, but on the teachings of modern science and an intellectual estimate of the value of all things. This may be termed the period of Illuminism, associated with the rise of libraries and of laboratories, and all the appurtenances of the modern university. The movement began in the rationalistic period, which related all truth to the thinking personality. In its thoroughness of method and its self-sufficiency, it broke with the traditions of the divine life in man, which are spiritual rather than intellectual, and need brotherhood and the community soul for their existence and expression. The real fundamentals of our life have a spiritual basis of belief, and are in the domain of social heredity; they lie outside of the things that may be discussed and dissected, outside of the inquisitive-intellectual. Our civilization rests—to quote the words of the late Professor Royce of Harvard—on “the possession of a common tradition, a memory of suffering endured and victories won in common, expressed in song and legend, in the dear names of great personalities that seem to embody in themselves the character and the ideals of the nation, in the names also of sacred places where the national memory is enshrined.”

The standard of goodness and beauty for a man is, in fact, a community sense. The authority of the Christian church is lodged in the communion of saints.

It is told of the philosopher Kant, that on the yearly occasion when the faculty of the University of Koenigsberg went in state to church to worship, he turned at the church door, and made off home to his study. The act revealed a deficiency in his whole attitude to truth, which demands brotherhood and worship, and even wholesome

play, for health and sustenance. He broke with sound psychology. This coldness to the genial comradeship of life is particularly deadly to Art in the best sense of the term. In his recent brilliant story, "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," the novelist Vicente Ibañez brings out this defect. It annoyed his hero, an Argentinian of French descent, "to have his family everlastingly holding up as a model a German cousin of his, "who only knew life as it is in books, and passed his existence investigating what men had done in other epochs, in order to draw conclusions in harmony with German views. . . . The people, appreciating that these near-sighted authors were incapable of any genial vision of comradeship, called them *Sitzfleisch haben*, because of the very long sittings which their work represented." Now the self-sufficiency of this *Sitzfleisch haben* type is the most deadly foe to Art, because of its utter obtuseness to the call of human brotherhood. On the next page the German cousin thus delivers himself of his findings regarding the Celt. Addressing a Spanish friend of the hero's: "You were miserable Celts, sunk in the vileness of an inferior and mongrel race whose domination by Rome but made your situation worse. Fortunately you were conquered by the Goths and others of our race, who implanted in you a sense of personal dignity."

Now it is just in the field of brotherhood and of Art that the Celt is the superior of the phlegmatic German. Take this from Matthew Arnold's lectures "On the Study of Celtic Literature," which he delivered as Professor of Poetry at Oxford some sixty years ago: "The Celt's quick feeling for what is noble and distinguished gave his poetry style; his indomitable personality gave it pride and passion; his sensibility and nervous exaltation gave it a better gift still, the gift of rendering with wonderful felicity the magical charm of nature." Arnold was a Celt through his mother, of the Cornish Penrose family. Still

more thoroughly Celtic in his ancestry was another Oxford voice of the century, John Ruskin, whose theories of Art and Life have a truth and a fervor that thrill us today. The Ruskings came from the heart of the Highlands, from the neighborhood of St. Fillan's Well in west Perthshire; and three of the London lad's grandparents were Ruskings. His first love was a French girl, and his sympathies remained with France. In the disasters of the War of '70-71 he still believed that the future of civilization was with her rather than with her whilom conqueror Germany. The following passage reads as if it had been written, not so far back as 1874, but since 1914, when the world awoke to the ruthless brutality of German *Kultur*:—"Accordingly, when the Germans get command of Lombardy, they bombard Venice, steal her pictures (which they can't understand a single touch of) and entirely ruin the country morally and physically, leaving behind them misery, vice, and intense hatred of themselves, wherever their accursed feet have trodden. They do precisely the same thing by France—crush her, rob her, leave her in misery of rags and shame; and return home, smacking their lips, and singing *Te Deum*.

"But when the French conquer England (here he refers to the Norman Conquest) their action upon it is entirely beneficent. Gradually, the country, from a nest of restless savages, becomes strong and glorious; and having good material to work upon, they make of us a nation stronger than themselves."

A recent writer, Dr. Dawson, has pointed out the difficulties in appreciating Ruskin: his many subtleties and variations and extraordinary transformations, so that he seems sometimes reactionary, and at other times ultra-progressive. Tolstoy regarded him as a great man misunderstood by his countrymen and underrated. Perhaps it might be said of him with justice, as it was said of Shakes-

peare: "He saw life steadily and he saw it whole." At any rate he had the French gift of fearless sincerity; a supreme *intellectual conscience*.

The following characteristics mark all Ruskin's thoughts and discussions. First a belief in the unity of life, with religion as its center and active power. He expressly states that when art is not in the service of religion, it forthwith becomes debased. Yet, while religion asserts a unity of life and conduct, it also and equally asserts a dualism in philosophy; a higher law entering into and antagonizing the law of nature and the senses. The philosophical monist who asserts with Edmund in "King Lear":

Thou, nature, art my goddess; to thy law
My services are bound,

saps the foundations of religion and morality.

Again, Ruskin shows a deep distrust of beauty as an aim or object. He holds that the artist who starts with the sole object of producing something beautiful will fail in his endeavor. Art for art's sake or ornament's sake is a fatal motto. Beauty in art, like happiness in life, is not a legitimate aim, but is only really found as a sanction or accessory of Truth. Lastly, he stands for a humanism which regards man as essentially well-motived, and not to be appealed to in the best way from his selfish side. The "unnatural" in man is what is immoral; an unnatural act is an act which is strikingly selfish or without feeling, while a heroic, unselfish act is intensely human.

In *Les Problemes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine* by M. Guyau, I found these assertions of the unity of life and the serious character of all art worth the name worked out with a lucidity and a succinctness that were impressive. The writer died young, and his ideals have been

developed by his father-in-law, M. Fouillée, whose *Histoire de la Philosophie* is one of the best of modern textbooks on the subject. Guyau was bred in an idealist nursery. His early teachers were Plato the Academician and Epicurus the Stoic among the ancients, along with St. Paul and Marcus Aurelius; and, among the moderns, Immanuel Kant. When he arrived at the parting of the ways, where he must clarify, unify, and make consistent all that he had borrowed from the past, he found certain problems demanding his best energies: How to reconcile the Platonic and the Christian idea of the good with the Kantian idea of the categorical imperative, while at the same time giving due weight to the analytical results of modern experimental psychology, and the inflexible laws of evolution as determined by Darwin and his co-laborers.

Rejecting atheism and pantheism as furnishing no proper explanation of the Will, he regarded a theistic-idealism as getting its strength from its appeal to the religious instinct in man, which always enters into the metaphysical instinct; and the metaphysical instinct tends to discover in all things Mind, Thought, the Intellectual and the Moral. The whole drift of his philosophy was towards a rejection of the word "illusion" applied to Aspiration, Sympathy, Beauty and Love, as if these were accidents of the real world—a kaleidoscopic show, a mirage—while the seriousness of things rests elsewhere; and towards a positing of spirit as expressing the reality of existence. The so-called stern reality of life, external nature and matter conceived in terms of atoms, becomes in the last issue an illusion furnishing no final explanation of being.

According to Guyau, we cannot consider the beautiful and the good, objectively considered, as mere illusions, having only a subjective value. For long they were regarded as metaphysical realities, but now the evolutionary

school would reduce the beautiful, for instance, to a certain kind of pleasure, attached like every pleasure, to the life development. If we were to do away with sentient beings entirely, then the beautiful disappears, just as light and colors disappear when the eyes are closed; and the poetry of nature is thus confined to human brains. Here Guyau broke definitely with the teachings of Kant, who refused, even extravagantly, to consider beauty in terms of the useful and the perfect.

The German referred beauty to the "free play of our imagination and our understanding"—as something detached from real life, and wholly "disinterested." Schiller, formulating the same thought, but with more precision, concluded that art was essentially a play. The artist, according to him, rejecting material realities, finds the highest art where we come to play, so to speak, with the very basis of our being; of this nature is poetry, and above all dramatic poetry. Kant and Schiller's theory has been adopted by Herbert Spencer and most contemporary writers on æsthetics, who give it a more scientific form and attach it to the idea of evolution.

Does this theory, so widely accepted today, so passionately rejected by Ruskin, really grasp the true nature of æsthetic feelings? By clinging so exclusively to the pleasure of pure contemplation and of play, and wishing to keep art aloof from the true, the real, the useful and the good, and thus favoring a species of diletantism, has it not missed the serious, yea vital character of the highest art? So thinks Guyau.

He finds that Force, Harmony and Grace come from a will in harmony with its surroundings and with other wills; and they constitute beauty. Do the beautiful and the good differ in the sphere of the feelings? Spencer and Kant say they do; the identity of the two would destroy their theory that art is in the domain of the non-

serious, of play. Of course the good cannot be sport, and is above all things serious. Now if the beautiful lies in play, it must be separated from the good; for in the good we think of the end to be realized. In the beautiful, according to Spencer, it is the activity itself which realizes the end. Guyau will have nothing to do with this distinction. The activity, the will, for instance, which accomplishes an act of patriotism, is not only beautiful; it is good in the same measure that it is beautiful. The end, the country saved, is not only good, but beautiful in the same measure that it is good. In moral as in æsthetic judgments we cannot abstract the end pursued any more than in our moral judgments; sympathy, pity, indignation are beautiful and good at the same time. The art which has for its essential condition the sympathy we take in the pains and pleasures of others, is a "social creation"; it rests on a sure basis. A being is so much the more moral, the more capable he is of feeling profoundly an æsthetic emotion.

Ruskin, brought up by his Evangelical mother to recite the Bible off by heart, and Guyau, also a deep student of St. Paul, that master-psychologist, were both true to the apostle's magnificent Monism of Life, absorbing and engulfing in a higher unity the philosophical dualism of the law of nature and the law of the spirit. It is in this Monism that all art worth the name inheres. A close study of these two exponents of English and French art ideals at their very best reveals a hidden and profound sympathy between the two nations that has been somewhat lost sight of for a century or more. But it will appear more and more manifest as the years go by, and the present alliance demands a common purpose, and further glorious sacrifices and glorious victories for the cause of humanity.

Book Reviews

PROGRESSIVE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN AMERICA.

By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM, Professor of Christian Theology in the Pacific School of Religion. Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 1919. Pp. IX, 340. Price \$2.00.

If we are to regard our favored country as the "land of the Pilgrim's Pride"—to quote the words of the national hymn—then the book just issued from the leading New England press is particularly timely. This year there will be a celebration of the third centenary of the landing of Robinson's devoted companions at Plymouth Rock; and Dr. Buckham's pages aim at being a "Survey of the Enlarging Pilgrim Faith," which is the sub-title. No one is better fitted for the task than the genial and scholarly Berkeley divine.

He follows on the line of a Scottish treatise that came forth from old St. Andrews University when the reviewer was a student there; John Tulloch's "Religious Thought in Great Britain During the Nineteenth Century." The "Progress" described is fairly well limited to the past sixty years. There is a basis of personality in the treatment, the author having chosen seven theologians with whom he was more or less intimately connected and to whom he feels spiritual indebtedness, as themes for successive chapters. Prefacing the chapters are short biographical sketches after the manner of *Who's Who in America*. It is significant that the two leaders with whom he starts out are both Yale University men, Horace Bushnell and Theodore Munger. In many essential respects Yale is the most characteristically American of our universities in the religious and political type of public men it sends forth.

None of the sketches have more of a pleasant hero-worship flavor, approaching eulogy, than that of the octogenarian divine who spent a year or more of the closing period of his busy life in the metropolis of Southern California. Indeed, after a winter in the pulpit of the First Congregational Church of Los Angeles, Dr. Washington Gladden went home to Columbus, Ohio, to die. This association with California is not, however, recorded as it should

be in the biographical summary. Not so with Horace Bushnell, who spent some years in the Golden Gate when the state was still young, and was one of the founders of the College of California, at Oakland, which moved later to Berkeley and became the great State University of today, second largest of the universities of the country. Bushnell was offered the Presidency in the year 1861, but declined and returned to the East. This vigorous thinker and innovator Dr. Buckham rates as the second in chronological order of our three great American theologians: "Jonathan Edwards, Horace Bushnell, George A. Gordon—this," he states (p. 87), "is the true American theological apostolic succession. This estimate may seem at present extravagant, but I am convinced the future will confirm it. . . . William N. Clarke has had wider influence in the field of irenics, Borden P. Bowne in that of philosophy, but in insight and breadth and total accomplishment none has equaled Dr. Gordon," The last-named is still with us, a vigorous voice in the pulpit of the historic South Church of Boston.

To have Dr. Buckham at his best, read his tribute to Washington Gladden, "author of that immortal hymn, long ago discovered and adopted by the Christian consciousness and now illuminating every modern hymn-book worthy of the name, 'Oh, Master, Let Me Walk with Thee.' This hymn was written under the sense of loneliness caused by the author's theological isolation. It is a heretic's hymn—a 'heretic of yesterday' and a saint of today. Is the latter too exalted a title to fit this rugged, everyday man, companionable servant of righteousness and teacher of the people? . . . —a saint after the order of the Pilgrim fathers." J. M. DIXON.

THE SELF AND NATURE, by DE WITT H. PARKER, assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1917. Pp. VII. 316.

So much of modern philosophy and especially of Radical Empiricism has been written in complete disregard of the nature and definition of the self that it is a great relief to pick up this book which though assuming to proceed on the method of Radical Empiricism frankly declares that systems must be judged by their treatment of the doctrine of the self. By this standpoint the author wishes his system to be judged.

After showing a considerable tendency to identify the self with its mere activity he proceeds to affirm that the unity of the mind is a fact of immediate experience and that "the self is primary." "The unity of the mind," he says, "consists in the first place, of the contact of self with content; and, in the second place, of the interweaving of the many activities, which are the self, one with another. The activities are interwoven among themselves and with the content, and this web is the mind" (27). This description of the self is not complete, however, as it concerns only the contemporaneous phase. Speaking of the other or sequential phase of the self, he concludes that identity must be found in the region of the mind in which identity is given, and that this region is the self.

This conclusion is impossible if the mind is to be identified with its activities. There is nothing in fleeting activities that would bind the world of experience together. Each activity would be conscious of itself unless it were some transcendent activity able to survive and understand the whole process, maintaining an enduring identity through its power of relating all other activities to itself. Such transcending self the author assumes though he has made no provision for it in his system.

This assumption appears in his definition of perception as a contact of the self with a sensuous reality, and a representation through idea of other sense elements which might be given (53).

"Perception is never, as we know, the mere existence of a sense element in the mind; it always involves, in addition, the creation of a meaning. The sense elements in perception are recognized, interpreted, employed as signs; but recognition, interpretation, the signitive function are activities which belong to the self" (55).

He recognizes the necessity of affirming personality in order to provide an adequate doctrine of time and change, because in the existence of any impersonal thing change destroys its original character and makes it something essentially different. "In the self we have the most direct knowledge of the combination of new and old, of identity and diversity, essential to change" (96).

Likewise in the discussion of causation he clearly shows the impossibility of demonstrating the causal connection outside of personality itself. "In the phenomena of will alone does there exist the possibility of making the past a law for the future" (136). To this statement he adds another most significant for philosophy and particularly for theism; "He only can hope to understand who

finds it reasonable to interpret the processes of the external world after the analogy of the inner world" (143). After declaring that there are but two known types of necessity, logical and purposive, he writes: "Is it unlikely that the same type of necessity which exists within the mind should characterize the whole from which the mind sprang and upon which it depends" (145). And again, "There is necessity and law only where there is a will seeking fulfillment" (152). This would seem to be a clear enough charter for the theist to make some assumptions regarding the reasonableness of a supreme creative intelligence, but such a conclusion the author with an odd perversity rejects as impossible.

The conclusion of the book is sadly negative. After building nobly he decides for the impossibility of immortality and theodicy. Indeed considers that he has proved the mortality of personality. The fact is, however, that it is no greater leap to assume the reasonableness of personal immortality than is his assumption that the cause of the world is personal. If that personal cause is not itself the mere plaything of matter it must in some sense transcend the material order. Such transcendence is the very essence of personality. But if there be transcendence of any kind it might well be able to survive the tools with which it works just as here and now it survives material change and passing events. While openly denying it, the author is unwittingly theistic.

THEOLOGY AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE, by DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Dwight professor of Theology in Yale University. MacMillan and Co., New York, 1919. Pp. XVI, 270.

Those who are acquainted with Dr. MacIntosh's *Problem of Knowledge*, will take up this book with large expectation and will not be disappointed. It is a book not for those who have no doubts, but rather for those who seek apart from tradition and dogma the confirmation of Christian belief. From the beginning the author aims to meet the attack of scientific doubt and to defeat it upon scientific grounds rather than by appeal to authority or dogma.

Through the volume he holds to the scientific validity and reality of religious experience and hopes to discover therein all the facts needed for a tenable working theology.

Just as William Newton Clarke brought an answer to the theo-

logical questionings of fifteen years ago the author will do an undoubted service to the present time. The direct resort to religious experience for the proofs of ordinary doctrine is made because the writer believes that "Speculation can only elucidate what is involved in a hypothesis. It cannot, apart from any resort to experience provide verification. . . . And if theology is to become scientific it must be by becoming fundamentally empirical" (11).

The foundations of the discussion are laid upon the answers to the following questions:

"(1). Is there *religious perception*, or something in the religious realm corresponding to perception, viz., cognition of the divine as revealed within the field of human experience? (2). Is it possible to formulate, on this basis of the data made available in religious experience, *theological laws*, or generalizations as to what the divine Being does on the fulfilment of certain discoverable conditions? (3). Can *theological theory* be constructed in a scientific manner upon the basis of these laws?" (26).

Calling attention to the necessary presuppositions of all science he claims the same need for a theological science. Having done this he proposes to proceed with only such theological material as may be beyond proper scientific question or cavil to see if there is not enough to provide the necessary supports for religious theory. This method will of course be unsatisfactory to the theologian who deplores any compromise with the modern scientific spirit. The value of the volume, however lies in this, that it shows how without resort to those doctrines that give offense to many reverent thinkers, a vital and convincing theology may still be constructed.

So out of experience he draws conclusions for immortality, for the profound nature of sin, for the existence of God, and the uniqueness of Christ as the revelation of God.

His discussion of the attributes of God gains force by the settlement of the conflict of immanence with transcendence by means of personality in the divine Being (131).

With many points, the reader will find himself in disagreement, and some of these should doubtless be brought out in this review, except for the fact that the attempt made to furnish an empirical grounding for theology is so wholesome, and is here done so skillfully and with such constructive results that criticism is relatively unimportant in the face of positive advantages to be gained. It is a volume worth reading and owning for one's self.

HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY. By HOWARD C. WARREN, Boston. Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1919. XX., 450 pp. \$2.75.

One is impressed upon reading Professor Warren's contribution, "Human Psychology," to the long list of elementary psychology texts, with the scholarly and painstaking care that everywhere shows itself in both style and arrangement of the book. At the same time, one who is dealing hand to hand with the perplexing and pressing needs of human life, both as it comes before one in the college class-room, and in the larger associations in the complex community life, finds the book rather too academic, one might say, almost too prosaic, in style. The reviewer is convinced that the most effective text book in elementary psychology must be far more than a dry, mechanical, systematic though conscientious presentation of the accepted facts of the science. All too frequently, the course in elementary psychology is the only contact the student has with the scientific study of human behavior. If we keep in mind the great need that he shall better understand himself, and be better able to control and direct his own conduct through understanding and control of the mental factors that make conduct what it is; if we understand the central aim and purpose of education to be that of helping the individual to make more successful and constructive adjustments, then we must write our texts not merely as an introduction to the succeeding "courses" to be given in the further pursuit of our subject, not merely as a preparation for advanced study, but with the life needs, the practical human needs, of our students as the guiding and motivating purpose.

It would have added greatly to the strength and value of the book had this purpose been permitted to permeate its pages, rather than the more aloof and impersonal purpose of a presentation in most carefully chosen language of certain facts.

On the other hand, as a presentation of cold facts, as a combination of the view-point of the behaviorist, and of the older view-points and methods of the so-called structuralistic and functionalistic schools, the book is admirably done. This is not the place to approve or disapprove, according to one's own convictions, of any of the special modes of treatment or investigation of psychological facts, or to side with one school or the other as to what properly constitutes the field of psychological investigation. But to revert to the idea thrown out as a constructive criticism above, the author's leaning is so far toward the behavioristic method and

attitude in dealing with his facts that the student is likely to receive the impression that behavior is purely a matter of mechanics, and gain no impression of the dynamics of consciousness. Let us by all means use all objective devices of observation possible for determining what both overt and implicit behavior are. But let us not omit to make central the fact that through the study of behavior we are learning something more about the nature of conscious processes, the forces that go to make up human personality. Let the psychologist not forget, in his eagerness to get at the objective facts of behavior, that these objective facts must be facts to him and can be facts to him only in terms of his own consciousness, if they are to have any part in his world at all. And finally, if we shall accept the position, no matter in what particular words we may express it, that psychology has to do with the scientific investigation of human behavior, its causes and conditions, then let us by all means keep constantly before ourselves and our students the dynamic part played by consciousness in its relation to behavior, its relation to success or failure in making our adjustments to life situations. In actual experience, we find ourselves translating everything into conscious life to make it ours. In actual experience we find ourselves face to face with differences in conduct or behavior that grow out of thoughts, feelings, ideas, judgments, that is, not to continue the list, out of forms and factors in the mental life, the life of consciousness. Then let us not be content, in presenting to immature minds, to men and women whose most urgent need is self-control, and whose most insistent call is for action, a scientific introduction to the facts and laws of human behavior which is coldly anatomical, a catalogue of events, a glossary of technical terms, rather than the dynamics of human personality as it manifests itself in behavior. Better still, let us constantly take the dry bones of our science and clothe them with the living flesh. Let us use our anatomies, our structuralistic facts, our physiological substrate or correlate of consciousness, our classifications and our laws always as a means toward helping the student, in this his first and perhaps his only contact with our science, to see the dependable and inescapable relation between the forms and factors of the mental life and his adjustments, which constitute both his objective and his subjective behavior, and aid him in his peculiarly human task of so reconstructing or remaking this *psycho*-physical human nature of his that he shall make some progress in the direction of acquir-

ing that conscious control of conduct which alone gives any assurance of behavior that shall be progressively constructive.

Professor Warren's book is a most excellent anatomical analysis and is written with a painstaking care, and a clearness of diction that quite equal the range of scholarly knowledge which is evidenced on every page. But, on the other hand, we cannot but regret that there is everywhere lacking that dynamic element of vital contact with life needs, that vital translation into terms of life adjustments, which have been pointed out above. In this respect, the book is certainly not unique upon the ever lengthening shelf of psychology texts.

F. E. OWEN.

SPIRITUAL VOICES IN MODERN LITERATURE by TREVOR H. DAVIES. George H. Doran Company, New York, 1919. Pp. X, 312.

Some will complain that the use of literary criticism to bear a religious message is a perversion. Such criticism is short-sighted however in this, that there is no great literature which does not deal with the fundamental human instincts and as such is full of conclusions of the greatest moment for theology. The greatest study and the greatest interest of the human mind is ever the human reactions, those of human souls. These studies in this book are full of the homiletic interest but are therefore not the less valuable for purposes of moral teaching. It is appropriate that from time to time the deeper teachings of the masterpieces should thus be set forth.

The author begins by discussing Francis Thompson's "The Hound of Heaven" as the epic of the love that will not let us go. He follows with Peer Gynt as the example of the ignominy of half-heartedness. In the remaining lectures he deals with Ruskin's Seven Lamps of Architecture, Tennyson's In Memoriam, The Letters of John Smetham, Wordsworth's Ode to Duty, Morley's Gladstone, Browning's Saul, Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter, and Masefield's Everlasting Mercy. He does this with a freshness and vigor which is likely to add to the interest already present for these books and to send his readers back to a review of them under the light of his teaching.

Only those will be disappointed who find it always difficult to tolerate seriousness, or who cannot be satisfied with a book which is less than a thorough-going critique. This book is correct in assuming the aim of great literature to be a serious one. It possesses no

particular value as a critique, nevertheless it is valuable as sending many people back to the original springs of inspiration.

THE VITAL MESSAGE, by ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE. George H. Doran Co., New York. 1919. Pp. VII, 164.

It is not unusual for the desperate partisan frequently to declare the complete annihilation of the same enemy, because the partisan mind dwells upon the instances favorable to its conclusions and as stolidly overlooks those that are unfavorable. One can never look hopefully to such a source for scientific accuracy. Such a case of special pleading and inaccuracy is to be found in this book. Yet it will have considerable influence with the uncritical minds of such as will to believe it.

It frequently happens that men who are famous in one field of human endeavor carry the conceit of confidence to other fields of which they know nothing. They thus come to be listened to by the ignorant and uncritical while they make themselves ridiculous to the clear-sighted. There are illustrations a-plenty in contemporaneous history, as when a successful manufacturer attempts to enter the field of international diplomacy, or a chemist speaks with unabashed dogmatism in the field of theology.

The partisan bias of the book is disclosed by an attack upon institutionalized Christianity so obviously unfair and untrue as to be evident to one who has even read in the newspapers of the philanthropic and humanitarian effort to which the church is at present giving itself.

The author looks for the dawn of a new day through the discoveries of spiritualism, but he does not show the benefits. Neither does he disclose any moral and ethical values to flow from the substantiation of such doddering and feeble messages as are supposed to come from the unseen world. One might well pray for annihilation rather than to look helplessly forward to such an order of intellectuality as seems to be "disclosed" in the widely heralded "manifestations" of spiritualism.

Why are so many widely known men seeking after the occult? It is an indication of spiritual poverty, a loss of the sense of the things worth while. It is pursued by those who have lost or never had a religious faith worthy the name. It has been emphasized by the effect of the tragic events of the war upon many whose former materialism proves no longer adequate for the load of human tragedy.

Notes and Discussions

LIFE'S IDEAL

WE are going to be through with this life before very long. The longest life is short when it is over; any time is short when it is done. The gates of time will swing to behind you before long. They will swing to behind some of us soon, but behind all of us before long. And then the important thing will not be what appointments we had, or what rank in the conference, or anything of that sort—not what men thought of us, but what He thought of us, and whether we were built into His kingdom. And if, at the end of it all, we emerge from life's work and discipline crowned souls, at home anywhere in God's universe, life will be a success.

—Borden Parker Bowne

IBÁÑEZ AND THE CELTIC REVIVAL

The visit of the writer of "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse" to America brings us into closer touch with old Spain, for he may be regarded as the first Spaniard in these modern days who has struck the international key and found readers all over the world. Russia, Sweden, Norway, Hungary with Tolstoi, Laegerlof, Ibsen, Jokai and other notable writers have given their quota to world literature; and now Southern Europe—the sunny Mediterranean—is coming in for a share of popular interest. Part of the story, it is true, is laid in South America, of which the hero is a native; but the interest soon passes definitely to the Old World, and the intensity of the European crisis where the "horsemen," conquest, war, famine and death, have been riding in spectacular form as never before in the history of man.

It is to be noted that the novelist pays particular attention to the preposterous claims of the swelled-head Teuton to be a superior world race, especially when compared with the rival Celt, to whom many have never ceased to grant pre-eminence in the higher civilization. And the Prussian classed Spain with the Celtic peoples who were now decadent. In the new appreciation of values in civilization, which has definitely dethroned the Hun from the leading

place which he so coveted and has bidden him educate himself a little more in humanity before he takes even an equal rank among the nations, Ibáñez is determined that the Spaniard shall be classed as one with France and her allies in her civilization and her race ideals; standing for "culture" and not for "kultur."

The world has scarcely recognized as yet how much it has been saved from, in the matter of a pompous, dull and brutal tyranny, by the defeat of a Prussianized Germany in the late Titanic struggle. The higher literature, to begin with, owes more in the past to the Celt whom the Prussian bigot affected to despise than to the "dull German." This is Ruskin's term for the German pedant in his worst mood of self-complacency. To German dullness and English affectation he remarks in one of his best-known essays, "On the Pathetic Fallacy," "we owe the tiresome words 'objective' and 'subjective' which divide life as it was never meant by the Maker of all to be divided."

Ruskin was a Celt of the Celts. A writer in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* twenty years ago declared that he was the most analytic mind in modern Europe, a marvel of keen and just psychology, underrated by a Germanized world who talked in terms of the subjective and the objective. And Matthew Arnold, who was of Cornish Celtic stock by his mother and was termed "David, the Son of Goliath" by Swinburne, who did not fancy the dogmatic set-up of the elder Arnold (great man as he undoubtedly was) made it his mission when appointed professor of poetry at Oxford sixty years ago to reassert the claims of the Celt to literary hegemony in Europe. Here is what Matthew has to say on the subject: "Style (which adds dignity and distinction to literature) the Germans are singularly without. . . . The Normans may have brought in among us English the Latin sense for rhetoric and style—for, indeed, this sense goes naturally with a high spirit and strenuousness like theirs—but the sense for style which English poetry shows is something finer than we could well have got from a people so positive and so little poetical as the Normans; and it seems we may much more plausibly derive it from a root of the poetical Celtic nature in us. . . . The Celt's quick feeling for what is noble and distinguished gives his poetry style. . . . His sensibility and nervous exaltation give it a better gift still, the gift of rendering with wonderful felicity the magical charm of nature." No wonder Señor Ibáñez wishes to be classed as a Spaniard with the Celtic peoples and not as a Goth.

J. M. DIXON.

THE CHRISTMAS SCONCE

It is only a tarnished and twisted piece of brass, shaped by some thoughtless oriental after the pattern of the lotus in the hope of appealing to some Christian eye and thus to bring the daily meed of rice. The connoisseurs of art know it not for to them it is negligible. Yet its journeys have been wide and various. It has sailed the seven seas and has crossed many lands.

It has outlived the wrecking of numerous parsonages by the moving van, and has survived the critical inspection of parsonage committees. Like Paracelsus it "plunges into a dark tremendous sea", namely the box that holds the kitchen scullery, and unlike him it is hauled forth at the other side of a continent with the freshness of that morning when the stars sang together. Again and again it has been triumphantly mounted in mother's room, though whether its dilapidated receptacle would hold a candle is subject to debate.

It has a place in the family life distinct and individual. That is why it outlasts all vicissitudes of time and change. Time can but temporarily dim it and evil circumstance can only add oddity to its form. It does not meet the demands of "Household Art." It is innocent of the skill of East Aurora, but it will never be left behind. Why? O, that is another tale!

The "boy" in a high idealism to find a Christmas gift worthy of mother had visited store after store in the great city, even to the point of exhaustion trying to bring his ideal into step with the paltry sum in his hand. At dusk he drifted into a "Japanese" store, and the clerk saw the chance to get rid of a broken scone.

How much would you take for it? There you err, my friend. The "boy" has grown to manhood, and though he would, could not repeat this gift. To us it is more precious than rubies.

"THE YOUNG VISITERS"

London and other literary centers today are much tickled over an unnamed effort in fiction, *THE YOUNG VISITERS*, by a girl of nine, to which Sir James Barrie supplies a Preface. In many respects it is so delicate a satire on fashionable England of the immediate past, that, notwithstanding Barrie's emphatic guarantee of its authenticity, many have suspected a Barrie camouflage. Some of the ingenuous scenes in the narrative, such as the week end in London of two young unmarried people, recall objectionable incidents in some of Eleanor Glyn's stories, like "The Career of Kath-

erine Bush." Even the quaint spelling, with the intrusive South of England r's, has been carefully reproduced. The writer, now grown up, is living in England, and there seems to be no doubt whatever of the genuineness of the story. The triumphant face of the little authoress serves as a frontispiece. As a girl she was known in the neighborhood where the family lived—in Sussex—as a wonderful creator of impromptu charades and playlets.

The Philosopher's Shears

"Damning the abstract sinner is an easy matter, and seems to be meet, right and a bounden duty, but it looks different when it is our own flesh and blood."—*Bowne*.



"The coldest reasoner, the bitterest enemy of emotion, is as much the slave of temperament as the religious fanatic; he is driven by a concentrated passion for truthfulness."—*Sheldon*, "Strife of Systems."



"There is a cross at the heart of every human blessedness."—*Davies*, "Spiritual Voices in Modern Literature."



"As a rule there is not enough man in the pessimist to believe in anything great and reverent."—*Bowne*.



"We understand the acts of our fellows only on the basis of what we have done or longed to do."—*Parker*, "The Self and Nature."



"Every age has its pet hypocrisies, and our own is perhaps the self-righteousness of the crowd."—*Sheldon*, "Strife of Systems."

"A hogshead of soap bubble punctured, sinks into a teaspoonful of soap, and that is all there was ever in it."—*Bowne*.

Our Contributors' Page

ALBERT CORNELIUS KNUDSON, S. T. B., PH. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in Boston University is unusually qualified to speak of the work of Professor Bowne, having had an important part in the editing of Bowne's posthumous work Kant and Spencer. Beside this he is the author of many important works, the latest of which, *The Religious Teachings of the Old Testament*, is just from the press and will be reviewed in a future number of *THE PERSONALIST*.

EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN, PH. D., will be read with interest because he has just been inducted into the chair formerly occupied by Professor Bowne. His inaugural address *The Personalistic Method in Philosophy* forms a leading article in the current issue of *The Methodist Review*.

It is unnecessary to introduce again to Personalist readers DR. JAMES MAIN DIXON, F. R. S. E., whose work forms such an important part of the accomplishment of *THE PERSONALIST*. His latest book *The Spiritual Meaning of 'In Memoriam,'* is reviewed in this number.

THOMAS BLANCHARD STOWELL, PH. D., was long prominent in the educational affairs of New York and has been in recent years Dean of the College of Education of the University of Southern California. He has given over his active duties in the University and has found time to give us his idea of the philosophy essential to an educator.

FRANCIS M. LARKIN, PH. D., as the Editor of *The California Christian Advocate* has proved himself a conspicuous success as editor and writer. It is not usual for one in his position to turn aside from his own special interests to help another. For that reason the present article in *THE PERSONALIST* will be particularly appreciated.

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Manuscripts and communications should be addressed to THE PERSONALIST, University of Southern California, University Avenue and Thirty-fifth Street, Los Angeles. Stamps for the return of manuscripts should be enclosed.

TO THE GENTLE PERSONALIST

IT MAY please you to know that Mrs. Bowne has most graciously consented and we expect to begin shortly in the pages of *THE PERSONALIST* a series of papers dealing with the biographical detail of Professor Bowne's life. The need for something of the kind has long been felt. They should create a freshened interest in our master's work.

¶ All around the field we learn of preparations to participate in the future numbers of *THE PERSONALIST*. We hope that some of the people of whom we have heard will bring their good intentions to the point of early action.

¶ We are fairly bursting to give the names of some of the notables who have written us but fear there are some who would dislike our giving publicity to their testimonials. So here are a few that have been properly shrouded in anonymity.

¶ From the presidents of two eastern colleges:

¶ "I have read the first number of *THE PERSONALIST* with a great deal of interest and satisfaction."—"I read over the articles in *THE PERSONALIST*, and desire to congratulate you upon this journal. It is an ambitious enterprise for an institution and I trust it will meet with great success."

¶ From three college and university deans:

¶ "I spent five minutes looking at it and at once decided I could not afford to do without the magazine."—"I am glad that the good cause is getting gruffer voiced champions."—"I enjoyed it and learned from it."

¶ From five college and theology professors:

¶ "Please accept my hearty congratulations upon the advent of *THE PERSONALIST* so attractively clothed and in so right a mind. It means much to the intellectual and spiritual life of the Pacific Coast that we have in *THE PERSONALIST* a fit organ for philosophical and religious thought."—"You have made a splendid beginning and you deserve a wide patronage."—"We trust that it may be the beginning of a larger hearing for the personalistic way of interpreting life."—"I have read almost every word of the first number, and regard it as a very auspicious beginning."—"I rejoice that you have undertaken this work and I wish you success. I like every feature of it. . . . The mechanical workmanship is of a high quality and the result is very handsome indeed."